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About the Annie E. Casey Foundation
The Annie E. Casey Foundation is a private charitable organ ization
dedicated to helping build futures for disadvantaged children in the
United States.  It was established in 1948 by Jim Casey, one of the
founders of UPS, and his siblings, who named the Foundation in honor
of their mother.  The primary mission of the Foundation is to foster
public policies, human-service reforms and community supports that
more effectively meet the needs of today’s vulnerable children and
families.  In pursuit of this goal, the Foundation makes grants that
help states, cities, and neighborhoods fashion more innovative,
cost-effective responses to these needs. For more information about
the Foundation, visit www.aecf.org.
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INTRODUCTION
The Annie E. Casey Foundation is committed to aligning its programmatic and investment
objectives. We know that returns on our endowment investments are essential to the long-
term success of our grant-making activities. Rather than strive solely for financial returns,
however, we allocate a portion of our corpus to investments that enhance our programmatic
activity and simultaneously meet our fiduciary responsibilities. We refer to this practice as
“social investing,” and see it as inclusive of a range of financial instruments such as loans,
deposits, loan guarantees, and equity investments.
Social investments present significant opportunities for foundations. For example, at the
Annie E. Casey Foundation, we have made major grants to charter-school efforts, including
direct support for individual schools as well as the development of application-review
programs and accountability processes for schools. However, in the case of facilities
financing, we have found loans to be more strategically effective. These loans, as well as
a variety of other financial instruments, fall under the rubric of “program-related investments,”
a type of foundation investment defined by the U.S. Tax Code that is integral to the
Annie E. Casey Foundation’s social investing strategy.
In these pages, we explore the process and impact of a PRI designed to support large-scale
facilities financing in Indianapolis, Indiana. While the investment
represents a dramatic merger between our programmatic and
financial objectives, the Foundation’s social investment is only
a small part of a much bigger picture. This is also the
story of a group of powerful partners representing the
public, private, and nonprofit sectors who have
combined their resources and expertise to create an
innovative and promising financing model for charter
schools.
At a minimum, the Indianapolis Charter Schools Facilities
Fund offers great potential to strengthen low-income
families and improve outcomes in Indianapolis. For the
Annie E. Casey Foundation, we also hope that it might
one day serve as a model to make charter schools a scaled
component of the educational system in the United
States.
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Charter Schools
Defined
First introduced by the state
of Minnesota in 1991, charter schools
are tuition-free public schools that
operate independently within the
nation’s existing K-12 school system.
Over the last 15 years, the charter move-
ment gained significant traction as an
important policy option to address the
challenges facing the nation’s traditional
education system.  In 2004, a report commis-
sioned by the U.S. Department of Education
confirmed that charter schools are typically
smaller than conventional public schools and serve
a disproportionate and increasing number of
poor and minority students.
By definition, a charter is a performance contract
entered into with a sponsoring entity—tradition-
ally a state board of education or local school
board—that outlines what the school will attempt
to accomplish, how student performance will be
measured, and what level of achievement it will
attain.  In exchange for meeting the terms of such
a contract, charter schools are given autonomy
and flexibility to design their own curricula, hire
their own staff, and control their own budget.
As of September 2006, almost 4,000 charter
schools were operating across the country
serving nearly 1.2 million children, roughly
2 percent of the nation’s public school
students.
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THE CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS
& CHARTER SCHOOLS
In 2001, Mayor Bart Peterson took office determined to
support and improve Indianapolis’ public schools.
Like most mayors, however, Peterson had no formal role
in overseeing public education.  Years of effort by the
school system and community leaders had made a
difference, but much more was needed.  Less than
one-half of entering ninth graders in the area’s largest
school district, the center-city Indianapolis Public Schools
(IPS), were on track to finish high school on time.1
While passing rates were improving, progress was not
happening fast enough—particularly for Indianapolis’
poorest families.  From Peterson’s point of view,
charter schools represented a compelling solution to the
academic challenges facing the city’s most disadvantaged
students.  It was in this context that Indiana became the
37th state to pass charter school legislation in May of 2001.
However, Indiana’s charter statute has one particularly
unusual feature: It is the first and only state to allow a
mayor to create charter schools directly.
Mayor’s Charter Schools Office
Shortly after the Indiana General Assembly adopted the char-
ter legislation in 2001, Mayor Peterson  created a
Charter Schools Office to support his work as an authorizer.
This office was charged with day-to-day management of
the city’s charter approval and monitoring activities.
In 2001, the Annie E. Casey Foundation provided a $66,000
grant to fund development of Mayor Peterson’s charter-school
application-review process.  In 2002, the Foundation
awarded the city of Indianapolis an additional $375,000
three-year grant to develop a comprehensive charter-
school accountability system.  Over the total six-year pe-
riod through 2006, it has invested nearly $700,000 in the
Mayor’s chartering effort.
As a direct result of these investments, the city developed
a model accountability system through which the Mayor’s
office established expectations, monitored progress,
reported to the public, and made informed decisions about
the future of the city’s charter schools.
TheFoundation’s
education investments
are driven by the vision of
this core result:  One day – all
young people in tough neighbor-
hoods will achieve the aspiration
their families have for them—to gradu-
ate prepared for adult success and
well being in the worlds of work, family,
and citizenship.  A key aspect of this is the
simple premise that schools are an important
community tool for helping individuals and
families connect to economic opportunities,
 social networks, and other public services and
supports.  From early on, supporting new types of
schools and  organizations that help schools achieve
strong results has been an important part of AECF’s
approach to education improvement.  The Foundation
saw significant potential for charter schools to help
realize its programmatic objectives in its 10 Making
Connections  communities.  Started in 1999, Making
Connections represented a 10-year investment to
improve the outcomes for families and children in tough
or isolated neighborhoods.
Several studies clearly demonstrated that opening new
schools in troubled neighborhoods can have catalytic
effects.  Neighborhood children gain access to a new
educational option, encouraging young families to move
in. Families and other neighbors gain community
centers where they can tap into education and social
services.  As neighborhoods become more attractive
to families, businesses become more interested in
locating there.
If additional charters schools were to open citywide,
the Foundation saw that the potential for economic
development and revitalization in Indianapolis would
be vast.
Commenting on AECF’s Indianapolis involvement,
Bruno Manno, Senior Associate for Education,
noted, “The Foundation’s mission is to improve
the lives of the nation’s most at-risk kids.
These investments gave us a unique
opportunity to provide families with more
choices of new public schools that meet the
highest quality standards.  AECF has
supported the efforts in Indianapolis
right from the start because the
Mayor has shown he’s committed
to taking steps to build an initia-
tive focused on excellence
for families and kids.”3
By fall of 2003, five schools had opened their doors, several
more charters had been authorized, and many key elements of
the city’s accountability system were in place.  One area of
concern, however, was the city’s pipeline of quality charter-
school applications.  Indiana’s charter law allowed the Mayor
to grant five charters per annum, but the Mayor’s office
worried that local community groups would not be able to
produce five new quality applicants each year. Specifically,
they worried about a constraint not uncommon to charter
school developers: Who would cover the facility financing
costs?
The Facilities Challenge
While Indiana law provided charter schools statewide with
equivalent funding on a per-student basis, the legislation,
like that of most other states, failed to address school
facility costs.  As a result, most charter schools were forced to
use a significant portion of their instructional dollars for
facilities.
While most public schools are funded through revenue bonds
supported by local property taxes, charter schools do not
generally have access to the kind of low-interest, tax-exempt
debt available to other schools.
The facilities challenge is acute for other reasons as well.
School principals often lack a familiarity with the complexities
of school finance. Moreover, vacant school buildings are rarely
available in good condition or in a suitable location.
Often, a space must be adapted or upgraded, which further
adds to facility expense.  While some charter schools have
benefactors to help pay for a building or even donate one,
most—especially those in lower-income areas—do not.
The Office’s primary oversight tool was its “Charter School
Performance Framework,” built around four evaluative
areas2:
1) Is the academic program a success?
2) Is the organization viable?
3) Is the school meeting its operations and access obligations?
4) Is the school providing the appropriate conditions
    for success?
As part of its overall accountability efforts, the Mayor’s
Office used a range of data-collection methods to execute the
school-performance measures outlined in the Framework,
including a series of steps (called “prior actions”) that must
be completed before a school could provide instruction to
students, annual standardized testing, independent site visits,
parent and staff surveys, and governance and financial
reviews, among other requirements.
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and Education Reform
CONSIDERING A PROGRAM-RELATED INVESTMENT
While a traditional grant was an unlikely, if not an impossible solution, there was a far more viable
tool at the Foundation’s disposal. A Program-Related Investment (PRI) might be considered if the
project closely matched the Foundation’s programmatic priorities, stable and competent
program management and leadership were in place, and a source of funds enabled the repayment
on the investment.
Via its local Making Connections work and its larger school-improvement efforts, the Foundation
had already committed to supporting charter schools as a means of improving outcomes for
families and children.  Backing the Mayor’s charter school initiative could potentially help close
the achievement gap for the city’s most at-risk students, spur economic development, and work
to revitalize the city’s low-income neighborhoods.
In the case of Indianapolis charter schools, management and leadership proficiency could be
assessed through the charter application process and Charter School Performance Frame-
work.  Thoroughly vetting charter applicants on the front-end, monitoring them consistently
over time, and working through challenges at the school site substantially ameliorated
management concerns at the borrower level.  In short, the Charter School Performance Framework
ensured that the Foundation’s investment would deliver mission-oriented returns while
mitigating the Foundation’s financial risk.  This accountability system would ultimately prove
essential to attracting critical partners to the program.
Finally, the Foundation had reason to believe that charter schools presented less risk than real-
estate lenders and landlords had previously supposed. So long as a school fulfilled its performance
contract and its charter was renewed, its funding stream was effectively guaranteed by
the state.
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IN SEARCH OF SOLUTIONS
Mayor Peterson and his Charter Schools Office teamed up with the Annie E. Casey
Foundation to confront the facilities challenge.  The national Foundation staff and the local
Making Connections team were committed to an ongoing charter-school program in
Indianapolis and promised to give the issue careful consideration.  The question was how
to help solve the problem.
Renovating or upgrading an existing space to code for use by a school minimally costs several
hundred thousand dollars.  Purchasing land and constructing a new facility can be a multi-
million dollar endeavor, and that is only if the school can find a willing lender at affordable
rates.  Regardless, all obvious facilities solutions went well beyond the size of a typical
Foundation grant.  Even if grants could address the issue, they could realistically be used
only in a limited number of cases, which would do little to bring charter schools to scale as
an innovative educational solution.
Finally, because charter agreements are, by design, contingent contracts subject to
re-approval once every few years, charter schools tend to encounter resistance and
additional charges when they seek to obtain financing from conventional lending institu-
tions.  For example, many lenders and landlords perceive these unusual and inexperienced
institutions as risky and try to reduce the perceived risk by requiring extra loan guarantees,
security deposits, and/or premium rates that the schools typically cannot afford.
This issue resonated deeply with Indianapolis officials.  Of the 10 schools operating in
2004, only three had managed to obtain long-term financing for their permanent facilities.
To stimulate sufficient supply, the Mayor’s Charter Schools Office team knew it had to find a
way to address the problem.
In 1968, the Ford Foundation
pioneered the field of PRIs by
making direct, below-market-rate
charitable loans to organizations
that were a part of its program focus.
The U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1969
legally defined the investments as an
outlay by a foundation that can generate
financial return but primarily supports a
charitable project or activ ity. To be
classified as a PRI, the investment must meet
the following three criteria: 1) Its primary
purpose must be to further the tax-exempt
objectives of the foundation, 2) the produc-
tion of income or the appreciation of property
cannot be a signif icant purpose of the
investment, and 3) the investment
cannot be used to support lobbying or political
campaign activities.5
From a foundation’s perspective, even beyond
the expected financial return, PRIs are
extremely valuable tools.  In the United States,
foundations are required by law to distribute
5 percent of their endowments annually.
Referred to as the “payout,” this requirement
is typically met in the form of grants.
However, when the legal conditions are met,
PRIs are also qualifying distributions.
While loans are the most common PRI
instrument, making up more than half of
PRIs made, a PRI transaction can use a
number of investment instruments.
These include mission-related
deposits, loan guaranties, lines of
credit, asset purchases, equity in-
vestments, or recoverable
grants.
Program-Related
Investments
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In 2005, when development of the Facilities Fund was
already well under way, a study completed by the Kauffman
Foundation found the annual school-closure rate to be close
to 6 percent. Moreover, the study suggested that even
when charters do fail, the re-use rate of facilities was
upwards of 96 percent, suggesting that one of the chief
concerns of landlords and lenders—an inability to re-market
the space easily—had not frequently occurred.4
A PRI to support the prospective Charter Schools Facilities
Fund in Indianapolis appeared to be a perfect fit for the
Annie E. Casey Foundation. By creating several thousand new
seats in low-income communities, the schools would have a
demonstrable impact on the precise families and children the
Foundation sought to affect through its programmatic work.
If structured correctly, a Foundation-led PRI stood to
create substantial leverage by strengthening the credit of
charter schools with commercial lenders, lowering charter school
borrowing costs, and attracting significant private investment.
Moreover, if Indianapolis could demonstrate a replicable
structure for financing school facilities while simultaneously
convincing capital markets that charter schools were a sound
investment, the PRI could have national influence.
With a variety of financial instruments available, the next
step was to determine the most effective type of PRI.
Typically the Foundation’s PRIs range from between $500,000
to $2 million.  Using these funds as a loan, while certainly
possible, did not seem to be the most effective use of
limited resources.  Given the average expense of renovat-
ing or building a school, a PRI structured as a loan
would only allow one or two schools to receive financing at
any given time.  In order to generate the impact the
Foundation and the city of Indianapolis sought, it was
important to find a way to leverage its funds.  This would
mean employing some other form of PRI and bringing the
right partners to the table.
The Mayor’s Charter Schools Office felt confident that the
Foundation’s support would not only enhance the credibility
of the city’s charter schools with commercial lenders, but
also bring market-rate investors to the table.  The Mayor’s
team also suspected that the city might also be able to
attach its strong credit rating to charter schools, thereby
lowering the schools’ borrowing costs. Out of these
brainstorming sessions, the notion of a Charter School
Facilities Fund, co-sponsored by the city of Indianapolis
and the Annie E. Casey Foundation, and designed to
provide affordable financing for charter-school facilities,
was hatched.
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FINDING THE RIGHT PARTNERS
For policy reasons, all of the Foundation’s PRIs must flow through intermediaries, never to
schools or individuals directly.  For practical purposes, the team would also need a partner
with significant experience financing public projects in Indianapolis.
The Indianapolis Bond Bank
Created in 1985, the Bond Bank’s primary purpose is to serve as a financing
instrument for public works in the city of Indianapolis.  The Bond Bank does not
generally lend money but instead issues bonds and other debt instruments on
behalf of various city agencies.  Over time, the Bond Bank’s role has expanded to include
overseeing major economic development projects on behalf of the city,
working with the Mayor’s Office on strategic financial matters and, in particular,
issuing and managing debt.  In 2002, largely at the urging of Mayor Peterson, the Indiana
General Assembly amended the Bond Bank’s statute in order to allow the Bond Bank to
issue debt on behalf of charter schools.
While the Bond Bank’s public finance expertise and recent experience in the charter arena were
important, one of its most promising offerings was access to low interest rates via the
city’s AA credit rating.6  By using the Bond Bank as an intermediary, the city of Indianapolis
could attach a “moral obligation pledge” in connection with any debt issued on behalf of the
Facilities Fund.  In the simplest terms, the moral obligation pledge is similar to insurance.
Were it to make such a pledge, the city would have a moral, but not legal, obligation to
cover any cash shortfalls for debt-service payments in the event that a participating
charter school defaulted on its loan.  Because failure to honor the obligation would severely
jeopardize the municipality’s credit rating, lenders interpret moral obligation clauses as
a credible signal of assured repayment.  This assurance, in turn, allows financial institu-
tions to offer borrowers extremely advantageous interest rates.  Though the Bond Bank
could not affix Indianapolis’ moral obligation without the City-County Council’s approval,
executives felt confident that a measure would pass if the proposed Facilities Fund was
structured properly and had the Mayor’s support.
Local Initiatives Support Corporation
In Indianapolis, it became clear that a partner with a deep understanding of
charter school finance and school facilities would be necessary.  The Local Initiatives
Support Corporation (LISC) quickly emerged as an obvious thought partner and co-investor.
As the nation’s largest community development financial institution, LISC combines
corporate, government, and philanthropic resources to help nonprofit community
development organizations revitalize underserved neighborhoods by providing capital,
technical expertise, training, and information. While LISC is a national organization, it has
a community-based focus.  Program staff members are based in every city and many of the
rural areas where LISC-supported community development takes shape. In collaboration
with community groups, LISC staff help identify local priorities and challenges, delivering
the most appropriate support to meet local needs.
The Indianapolis Charter Schools Facilities Fund would be the nation’s first
city-developed, comprehensive charter-school facility-financing program.
The program would be designed to make up to $20 million in loans available to
qualified charter schools for the acquisition, construction, renovation, and leasehold
improvements of facilities.
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charter-school legislation.  As a Senior Program Officer with LISC Indianapolis explained,
“Charter schools are generally started by educators; they are great at teaching kids, but
they do not know nearly enough about building a school facility or getting it financed.
LISC’s value locally is that, as technical assistance providers, we can get these schools
ready to be borrowers.  Playing that intermediary role is hard; it is unconventional.  Banks
simply don’t have the time or resources to devote to that kind of work, but we do.”7  By
providing local schools with direct technical assistance and loans, assisting them in evalu-
ating facilities, and helping charters build organizational capacity in areas of board
governance, fund raising, and real estate development, LISC Indianapolis had quickly
established itself as the source of local expertise.
LISC was an equally valuable partner at the national level.  In 2003, LISC launched the
Educational Facilities Financing Center (EFFC).  Through the EFFC’s Loan & Guaranty Fund,
LISC invested in the creation and/or expansion of local financing funds that supported the
facility needs of charter schools in particular markets.  Through the EFFC’s Seed Fund, LISC
provided capacity building and predevelopment recoverable grants to charter schools via
local LISC offices and other suitable organizations.  As of 2006, LISC had closed almost $20
million in loan and guarantees to seven unique local financing funds and committed almost
$1 million in Seed Fund companion grants to support five of its loan and guaranty
investments.8
After initial conversations with the Foundation and the Mayor’s team, LISC agreed to match
AECF’s investment in the proposed Fund.  Though the specific financial tool was still unde-
cided, AECF and LISC had each tentatively agreed to invest one million dollars, expecting
that their money would most likely take the form of a loan guaranty—that is, a promise by
the organizations to repay a borrower’s debt should that borrower default on the obliga-
tion. A loan guaranty was thought to offer the ability to leverage available funds by
enhancing the credibility of the city’s charter schools with commercial lenders, and it
would maximize the impact by bringing market-rate investors to the table.  Additionally,
utilizing a loan guaranty meant that funds would only be drawn down in the case of default
and never actually lent out to the schools for construction needs.
Equally important, LISC’s local leadership brought substantial public and private finance
experience to the team, making LISC an even stronger co-investor and thought partner.
With support from LISC at the local and national level, it was initially estimated that the
Facilities Fund would be able to raise $20 million and support 15-20 school construction
projects over the following five years.9  Ultimately, this would mean the creation of ap-
proximately 4,000 new seats for Indianapolis’ struggling, low-income students and the
revitalization of several of the city’s poorest neighborhoods.
Bank One & JP Morgan Chase
With the support of the Bond Bank and LISC secured, the next task was to find an
appropriate lending institution to join the syndicate. Identifying a lender
interested in investing substantial private capital was critical.  Here again, the city’s
relationships proved invaluable.
Leaders at the Bond Bank had worked successfully with Bank One on numerous occasions,
and thought highly of the bank’s understanding of municipal finance issues.  On the strength
of the Bond Bank’s recommendation, AECF, the Bond Bank and the Charter Schools Office
reached out to a local Vice President with Bank One’s municipal finance team.
Bank One was immediately enthusiastic about the opportunity.  Over the years, the bank’s
regional municipal-finance team had developed a healthy business providing capital to
several of Indianapolis’ largest public-works projects.
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Bank One viewed the bank’s participation in the proposed Charter Schools Facilities Fund
not just in financial terms, but also as another way to demonstrate Bank One’s commitment
to the city of Indianapolis’—a commitment it took very seriously.
In 2003 alone, Bank One donated approximately $100 million to nonprofit organizations
nationally and, with its partners at JP Morgan Chase, provided approximately $1 billion in
community development lending. The opportunity was of special interest to Bank One at
the time because it offered the potential to enhance the institution’s Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA) rating. At the time of the Facilities Fund effort, Bank One was in
the midst of merger discussions with JP Morgan Chase—a deal that is now complete – and
its standing with CRA regulators could have impacted the approval of the merger.
STRUCTURING THE DEAL
Based on a projected demand of 15-20 school construction projects over the next five years,
Bank One agreed to extend a $20 million line of credit to the Indianapolis Bond Bank, while AECF
and LISC both agreed to provide $1 million dollars in the form of loan guaranties to be drawn down
only in the case of default. After borrowing from Bank One, the Bond Bank would loan money to
qualified charter schools for the acquisition, construction, renovation, and leasehold
improvement of their facilities. Participating schools would then make regular debt-service
payments to the Bond Bank that would in turn be used to repay the line of credit to Bank One.
Under this scenario, AECF’s funds would never actually be lent out to the schools for
construction, or even leave the Foundation’s coffers.  Rather, the funds would remain with AECF and
LISC and only be drawn down in the case of default.  With AECF and LISC willing to shoulder the
burden of any initial losses, the Bond Bank would not have to return to the
City-County Council to make good on the moral-obligation pledge.  LISC was also very
comfortable with the idea of loan guaranties as it is had employed them successfully on
previous occasions.
Anticipating that most loans would be used for school renovation rather than construction, the
maximum loan size was capped at $750,000, with exceptions to be approved by an advisory
review committee.  Total borrowing costs to individual schools would range between approxi-
mately 3-6 percent of the loan size.  Even if a school could access funds on the open market, these
borrowing costs represented a substantial discount.  Without a program like the Facilities Fund,
charter schools could expect to pay interest rates of upwards of 10 percent if financed by traditional
sources.  Over the course of a 10-year mortgage, a school borrowing the maximum amount
from the Fund stood to save up to $190,000.
In case of excess demand for the Facilities Fund, priority would be given to applications
from schools in which at least 50 percent of the student body was eligible for the federal
free or reduced-price meal program.  As a rule, charter schools operated by for-profit
educational-management organizations would not be eligible for the program.
Fund Management
In addition to its current role as authorizer, the Charter Schools Office would take primary
responsibility for marketing the Facilities Fund and directing all inquiries to the Bond
Bank.  Should a participating school experience difficulty meeting its loan obligations, the
Mayor’s Charter Schools Office would work with the school to identify problem areas and
develop a strategy for resolution.
The Bond Bank would establish a Charter School Loan Review Committee to review all loan
applications that would in turn make recommendations to the Bond Bank’s Board of Directors.
Given its experience overseeing major public works projects, the Bond Bank would also
monitor the school construction process and oversee the Fund’s loan portfolio.
At the local level, Indianapolis LISC would provide technical assistance to support charter
schools in the application process and provide loan underwriting services to the Bond Bank,
including an analysis of risk posed by the proposed loan.  At the national level, LISC’s EFFC
would retain a voting seat on the Loan Review Committee.  This committee, comprised of
representatives from the Bond Bank, the Mayor’s Charter Schools Office, LISC’s EFFC,
Indianapolis LISC, and Bank One, would review all applications for the Facilities Fund.
AECF took a non-voting seat on the Loan Review Committee because, as a private
foundation, AECF is not allowed to further direct the funds once the initial investment is
made.  The Foundation’s role would be limited to monitoring its investment once the deal
closed, including receiving regular reports from the Bond Bank and making an annual site
visit.  For AECF, regular reporting requirements were critical not only to ensure that its
investment was meeting its intended programmatic and financial goals, but for other
reasons as well.  Because of the nature of AECF’s guaranty provided on behalf of the
Indianapolis Bond Bank, the Foundation was required to exercise expenditure responsibility
over the PRI and provide information to the IRS on an annual basis regarding the guaranty.
This helped assure the government that the funds were being used to further the
Foundation’s charitable purpose.
Risk Mitigation
Settling on the Fund’s basic structure and management responsibilities had not been
without its challenges, but it was relatively easy in comparison to other aspects of the deal.
In particular, while everyone agreed that the Facilities Fund should provide affordable school
construction loans to as many charter schools as possible, no one wanted to lose money in
the process.  All parties agreed that necessary precautions would need to be taken to
minimize each partner’s unique financial risks.  Because the Facilities Fund included partners
from the public, private, and nonprofit sectors, mitigating all parties’ risks and keeping
the cost of capital low was a balancing act requiring substantial creativity.
Bank One’s needs were relatively straightforward.  In addition to making a fair return on
its investment, the bank needed to meet two conditions.  First, the bank’s line of credit
needed to be senior debt, meaning that its debt must be repaid before any other creditors
receive payment.  Second, still somewhat uncomfortable with the credit risks charter
schools posed, Bank One needed the city’s moral obligation pledge in order to lend at
favorable interest rates.
The Bond Bank understood that the city’s moral obligation pledge was the key to the deal.
Ironically, in order to offer this commitment, the Bond Bank needed to be certain that
it would never be called upon to fulfill its pledge.  Covering a cash shortfall would require
seeking an appropriation from the Indianapolis City-County Council, a politically
unattractive option.
Requiring borrowers to set aside one year’s worth of debt repayment in a debt service reserve
is an industry-wide standard practice, and the Fund was structured for participating schools
to fund the debt reserve by borrowing the capital necessary as a part of the total loan
amount.  However, in exchange for the city’s moral obligation pledge, the Bond Bank
insisted on a second payment reserve.  Funded by AECF and LISC’s loan guarantees, this
second reserve would function as a “first loss” pool.  This meant that, in the event of
default, AECF and LISC would be required to cover the first $2 million of losses.
At the end of the process, the Fund structure was modified slightly as the Bond Bank
applied for and successfully received funds from the U.S. Department of
Education (DOE) to fund the debt reserve.  The U.S. DOE grant funded the entire debt
reserve up-front, taking that burden off the individual school borrowers.
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This element made the Facilities Fund even more affordable for participating schools,
allowing them to use borrowed funds exclusively for project costs (i.e. site
acquisition, construction, or renovation).
In order to secure the city’s moral obligation, and the favorable interest rates that came
with it, AECF and LISC agreed to assume full responsibility for the first $2 million in default
losses.  However, neither organization wanted to jeopardize their investment.  Just as Bank
One sought security by way of the city’s moral obligation pledge, and the Bond Bank sought
protection via a second payment-reserve fund, AECF and LISC wanted to carve out
safeguards as well.
The Foundation’s previous work designing the city’s charter approval process and Charter School
Performance Framework served as the first line of protection, shielding both ACEF and LISC
from substantial risk.  If these protections were not enough, both organizations saw an
opportunity to seek additional protection via detailed Fund Management policies and the
actual Guaranty Agreement. These outline every possible contingency as well as each party’s
specific responsibilities.  Issues covered in the documents include everything from the
exact credit approval criteria to how losses and other assets would be divided in the event
of a default.  Due to the limited role it would play after the deal closed, most of AECF’s
protection came by negotiating financial covenants and monitoring procedures into the
document’s final language.
By taking an active role in designing these documents, AECF and LISC prevented the
possibility of risky loans being made, required appropriate monitoring and servicing, and
diminished the chance that default might occur.
AECF’s interests were also protected by Indianapolis LISC, which was incorporated into the
Fund Management policies, by providing applicants with technical assistance.  In addition to
reviewing applications, LISC’s local staff also agreed to present the Loan Review Committee
with a written report summarizing the applicant’s strengths and weaknesses based on various
programmatic and financial indices, allowing it an additional opportunity to voice its concerns.
Finally, the city had already established itself as a highly capable authorizer and the partners
were confident in Mayor Peterson’s commitment to see the city’s charters succeed.
The accountability system through which the Mayor’s office established expectations,
monitored progress, reported to the public, and made informed decisions about the future
of the schools had already been lauded nationally as a best practice.  To AECF, the net
benefit of the city’s comprehensive and proactive accountability system was clear.  Should a
Mayor-sponsored charter school experience any difficulty—academically, financially, or otherwise
—the system was specifically designed to detect and correct any issues well before default
was likely to occur.
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CONCLUSION
On April 18, 2005, the Indianapolis City-County Council passed the measure
enabling the Indianapolis Bond Bank to administer the $20 million Fund by a near
unanimous vote. With the Fund a reality, the Annie E. Casey Foundation and its Education
Initiative team is looking ahead to additional opportunities to support the facility needs of
charter schools in other states.
The Facilities Fund is just one example illustrating how PRIs can bridge the gap between
the public, private, and nonprofit sectors to solve crit ical national
problems in local communities. In this case, it is unlikely that a grant could have attracted
the kind of multi-sector co-investment capital required to meet the needs of prospective
charter schools in Indianapolis. Fortunately, the Foundation has access to a wide range of
philanthropic tools—including social investments—that allow us to respond to the needs of
a specific situation in whatever way is best suited to the local context.
The use of PRIs and other social investments enhances the Foundation’s ability to affect
change in neighborhoods. They present opportunities to leverage limited funds more
effectively, build the capacity of organizations, complement grant making, and offer larger
levels of financial support when it is needed. A foundation’s financial influence,
especially when combined with that of other institutions, also has the capacity to affect
market behavior in ways that positively impact the communities in which it works.
Most importantly, PRIs represent a powerful philanthropic tool that can substantially
benefit communities for decades to come.
The Annie E. Casey Foundation, has always sought out innovative solutions to achieve our
mission. The range of social investments available to us continues to grow, creating more
opportunities for creative, flexible forms of financing for people and organizations work-
ing to strengthen families and improve outcomes in communities across the country.
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